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Abstract 
 
A large literature has used tests for Granger (1969) non-causality, GNC, to examine 
the interaction of military spending with the economy. Such tests answer a specific 
though quite limited question: can one reject the null hypothesis that one variable 
does not help predict another? If this null is rejected, there is said to be Granger 
causality, GC. Although the limitations of GNC tests are well known, they are often 
not emphasised in the applied literature and so may be forgotten. This paper considers 
the econometric and methodological issues involved and illustrates them with data for 
the US and other countries. There are three main issues. First, the tests may not be 
informative about the substantive issue, the interaction of military expenditure and the 
economy. The difficulty is that Granger causality, incremental predictability, does not 
correspond to the usual notion of economic causality. To determine the relationship of 
the two notions of causality requires an identified structural model. Second, the tests 
are very sensitive to specification. GNC testing is usually done in the context of a 
vector autoregression, VAR, and the test results are sensitive to the variables and 
deterministic terms included in the VAR, lag length, sample or observation window 
used, treatment of integration and cointegration and level of significance. Statistical 
criteria may not be very informative about these choices. Third, since the parameters 
are not structural, the test results may not be stable over different time periods or 
different countries.  
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1. Introduction. 
 
A large literature has used Granger (1969) causality, GC, tests to examine the 
interaction of military spending with the economy. The null hypothesis in these tests 
is Granger non-causality, GNC: that one variable does not help predict another. For 
instance, Dunne and Smith (1990), in the first issue of this journal, could not reject the 
hypothesis of GNC in both directions between the share of military expenditure and 
unemployment in a sample of OECD countries. Tang et al. (2009) also test for GNC 
using global panel data and find no evidence for GC from unemployment to military 
expenditure, but some evidence for GC from military expenditure to unemployment 
for non-OECD countries. There are also many studies testing GNC between military 
expenditure and other economic variables, particularly output; early examples being 
Joerding (1986), Kinsella (1990), Chowdhury (1991), Chen (1993) with more recent 
examples being Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003) and Kollias et al. (2004, 2007), who 
also take account of the possibility of cointegration. 
  GNC tests are a useful statistical technique to answer a specific though quite 
limited question: does one variable help predict another? Although the limitations of 
GNC tests are known, they are often not emphasised in the applied literature and so 
may be forgotten. Therefore it seems useful to survey the application of the technique 
and its limitations, using data from the US and other countries for illustration. We 
emphasise the short-run time series issues, the longer-run cross section issues in the 
military expenditure growth relationship are discussed in Dunne et al. (2005) and 
some of the wider econometric issues in Dunne and Smith (2007).   
The attraction of the GC approach is that it treats all the variables, military and 
economic, as endogenous; allows effects in any direction; and uses an ‘atheoretical’ 
reduced form, vector autoregression, VAR, framework. This has the advantage over a 
structural model in that it does not require identification. The identification problem is 
apparent in the contrast between the literature on the economic effects of military 
expenditure, which treats military expenditure as exogenous and GDP as endogenous, 
and the literature on the demand for military expenditure which treats military 
expenditure as endogenous and GDP as exogenous. To identify both relationships 
requires having some exogenous strategic or political variables (such as measures of 
threat) that shift military expenditure but not GDP and some economic variables that 
shift GDP but not military expenditure. It may be difficult to find such variables. 
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However, the advantages of the reduced form approach come at some costs, including 
the difficulty of interpreting the results; the sensitivity of the tests to the specification 
of the VAR and the fact that since the estimates on which the tests are based are not 
structural, they may not be stable2. 
Section 2 discusses the wider theoretical issues in the interactions between the 
economy and military expenditure. The subsequent sections discuss a series of issues 
in the use of the concept of Granger causality: definition and testing, integration and 
cointegration, measuring the size and direction of the effect, instantaneous causality 
and the number of variables to include in the VAR. These issues are illustrated with 
data, primarily from the US, but in section 9 other countries.  
 
2. Interactions between military expenditure and the economy 
 
The standard economic account of how a nation determines military expenditure 
emphasises perceptions of:  the threats to its security; its ability to pay, usually 
measured by GDP; and the opportunity costs of military expenditures. These 
perceptions are mediated by domestic political and bureaucratic institutions, 
including, perhaps, a military industrial complex. The economic effects of military 
expenditure may include short-run Keynesian demand effects and longer-run supply 
effects, such as displaced investment. Within standard economic models, these 
economic effects of military spending are usually regarded as being quite small and so 
generally ignored, except for the case of financing major wars, Smith (2009). 
   Historically, the effect of major wars means that military expenditures have 
shown much larger variations than any other category of government finance, and 
these are usually considered as exogenous and have been used to measure the effects 
of fiscal policy, e.g. by Hall (2009) for the US. This variation is clear in the US, 
where the share of National Defence Expenditures in GDP was less than two per cent 
of GDP during the inter-war period; then rose with the war, peaking at around 50% of 
GDP in 1943 and 1944. With the end of World War II, the share fell sharply to around 
seven per cent, rising again to almost 15 per cent in 1953, with the Korean War.  
                                                 
2 Micro-econometrics uses a quite different concept of causality from GC, based on comparison of 
different potential outcomes: two hypothetical states of the world one with the potential cause, usually 
labelled the treatment, and one without. Heckman (2008) or Angrist and Pischke (2009) provide 
discussions of this concept and Lechner (2006) discusses the relationship between them, but we confine 
ourselves to GC.  
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Subsequently the share trended downwards, jumping upwards in the late 1960s with 
the Vietnam War; reaching a peak of 10 per cent in 1967.  The share then resumed its 
downward trend till 1979, falling to 5.7 per cent. With the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the election of President Reagan and worsening relations with the Soviet 
Union; the share rose, peaking in 1986 at 7.8 per cent. As the Cold War thawed and 
then ended, the share fell; reaching a low of 3.8 per cent in 2000. The Global War on 
Terror, after 2001, increased the share to just over 5 per cent in 2008. By US post-war 
historical standards, this is still quite low; military expenditure had accounted for over 
five per cent of US output in every year from 1941 to 1994. 
The account above emphasises strategic factors, particularly wars, in shifting 
the share of military expenditure; but there is a long tradition of explaining military 
spending not by its strategic function but by its economic function: it is necessary to 
maintain growth and profitability. Part of the context for this explanation is the high 
unemployment of the inter-war period. The slump was widely interpreted as an 
inability of capitalism to generate enough effective demand, consumption or 
investment, to maintain full employment. Many forecast that World War II would be 
followed by a slump similar to that following World War I. This did not happen; the 
period from the end of World War II until the crises of the 1970s was one of low 
unemployment that, in retrospect, was labelled a golden age of capitalism, Glyn, 
(2006).  
Some argued that military expenditure was the source of the extra effective 
demand that stopped capitalism sinking into depression; since the US and UK devoted 
a much higher share of output to the military than their previous peacetime norms. 
The most influential exposition of this view was Baran and Sweezy (1966). This 
argument, sometimes labelled military Keynesianism, was developed by various other 
authors, particularly with reference to the US. They suggested that military 
expenditure was used to offset the tendency to stagnation and unemployment and 
adjusted to stabilise the economy and thus was a blessing for capitalism, rather than a 
burden. Cypher (2007) suggests that there has been a shift from military 
Keynesianism to “global-neoliberal militarism”, in which the economic benefit of 
military expenditure comes through rather different channels.  
There are a variety of problems with the military Keynesian argument.  It is 
not clear that either Marxist or Keynesian theory actually predicts such under-
consumption tendencies. The strategic explanations, rooted in war and the communist 
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threat, seem a better explanation of military expenditures than economic justifications. 
It is relatively straightforward to tell a strategic story to explain the share of military 
expenditure in the US, as was done above. It is very difficult to tell an economic 
story. Although World War II, the Korean Wars and the peak of the Vietnam wars 
were periods of relatively full employment in the US, the strong downward trend in 
the share of military expenditure is not marked by any corresponding upward trend in 
unemployment. The extent of the communist threat to the US is a matter of dispute, 
but it was certainly perceived as real by US decision-makers. While economic factors 
were certainly important at a micro level (weapons projects and base locations) they 
seem less so at a macro level. Military expenditure would be a very bad fiscal 
regulator because of the lags before it comes into effect: it takes too long to plan and 
implement to be an effective stabiliser, Smith & Dunne (1994).   
Many countries with low military expenditure, in particular Germany and 
Japan, showed lower unemployment and faster growth than the US and UK, though it 
could be argued that they benefited from the spillovers from UK and US military 
Keynesianism. There are other explanations for the golden age and why it came to an 
end in the 1970s. When the Cold War ended, the UK and US cut their military 
expenditures substantially and rather than sinking into unemployment both grew 
rapidly; benefiting from the peace dividend. The cuts in military expenditure reduced 
government deficits, which allowed lower interest rates, boosting investment in the 
technology boom of the 1990s. 
Granger causality methods appear to avoid the complexity of the underlying 
theoretical arguments, by simply considering bivariate relations between military 
spending and an economic variable, like growth or unemployment. The alternative is 
to specify an underlying  structural model, recent Keynesian examples are Pieroni et 
al. (2008) and Atesoglu (2009).  
Clearly, there are a range of possible interactions. Keynesian demand side 
explanations might suggest a positive effect of military expenditure on output; supply 
side displacement of factors of production might suggest a negative effect. Ability to 
pay arguments might suggest a positive effect of output on military expenditure; while 
military Keynesian effects to stabilise output might suggest a negative effect: if output 
drops military expenditure is increased to compensate, D’Agostino et al. (2010). 
Below we consider whether tests for GNC can shed any light on these interactions. 
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3. Definition and tests 
 
Suppose that we are interested in the relationship between a measure of military 
expenditure, e.g. the logarithm of real military expenditure, , and an economic 
variable 
tm
ty , say the logarithm of output, but it could be unemployment or investment; 
and we have data 1, 2,..., .t T=  A variable, say , is said to be Granger causal, GC, 
for another variable, 
tm
ty , if knowing past t im − , in addition to other available 
information including past t iy − , helps to explain current ty ;  or equivalently, current  
 helps to predict future tm t iy + . There are a number of points to note about this 
definition. Firstly GC is defined relative to a particular information set, to which the 
potential predictor is added.3 Secondly, this is GC in expected value, one could also 
have GC in higher moments, for instance the variance of ty  might be predicted. 
Thirdly, there is the complication that it is possible that  may not help predict tm 1ty +  
one period ahead, but may help predict t hy +  several periods ahead, because it works 
through indirect effects. We ignore this issue which is discussed by Dufour and 
Renault (1998). 
GC measures incremental predictability, relative to an information set, not 
causality in the usual sense: weather forecasts are GC for the weather, but few regard 
them as causing the weather. The use of the abbreviation GC for Granger Cause is to 
emphasise that this is not causation in the usual sense. The fallacy of inferring 
causation from temporal sequence is known as post hoc, ergo propter hoc, ‘after it 
therefore because of it’, which is the title of a famous article, Tobin (1970), criticising 
the use of timing to establish causality. This timing problem is particularly severe in 
economics because of the role of expectations and intentionality.  For instance, the 
permanent income theory, which says consumption is determined by expected future 
income, implies that changes in consumption are not predicted by past income, while 
consumption does predict income. So according to the theory consumption is GC for 
income, while income is GNC for consumption, the reverse of the economic causality.  
                                                 
3 Granger (1969, p428) originally defined it that “  is causing tY tX  if we are better able to predict tX  
using all available information than if information apart from  had been used.” But this is not 
operational, since one cannot specify all available information. 
tY
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Granger (1969) did not provide a test for GC, the standard test was provided 
by Sims (1972), so it is sometimes called Granger-Sims causality4. The general 
framework is provided by a vector autoregression VAR 
1
k
t o t i t i
i
Y a d AY u−
=
= + +∑ t t  or ( ) t o tA L Y a d u= +  (1A) 
Where  is an  vector of endogenous variables;  is a vector of deterministic 
elements;  a vector of errors with expected value zero and covariance matrix 
; and 
tY 1n× td
tu
( ')t tE u u = Σ 1( ) ... kkA L I A L A L= − − −  is a polynomial in the lag operator. For 
illustration assume , and that log output and log military expenditure, 2, 2n k= =
,t ty m , are represented as a second order VAR with trend 
1 2 1 1 2 2
10 10 11 1 12 1 11 2 12 2 1
1 2 1 1 2 2
20 20 21 1 22 1 21 2 22 2 2
t t t t
t t t t
y a a t a y a m a y a m u
m a a t a y a m a y a m u
− − − −
− − − −
= + + + + + +
= + + + + + +
t t
t t
   (1B) 
The elements of the variance covariance matrixΣ are: 
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2( ) ; ( ) ; ( )t t t tE u E u E u u 12σ σ σ= = = . 
And the null hypotheses are:  
(a) that  is GNC for tm ty , 
0 1 2
21 21 21: 0H a a= =  and  
(b) that ty  that is GNC for  tm
0 1 2
12 12 12: 0H a a= = .  
The alternative hypotheses are 1 1 221 21 21: 0;H a a 0≠ ≠ and 1 1 212 12 12: 0;H a a 0.≠ ≠   
 Depending on the results of these tests, there are four outcomes with GC 
running: in both directions (both hypotheses (a) and (b) are rejected), one direction, 
the other direction, or neither direction. The hypotheses can be tested with standard F 
statistics on each equation, though these are only valid (i) asymptotically because of 
the lagged dependent variables in the equations and (ii) if the variables are stationary, 
I(0). Both small samples and I(1) variables will cause the p values associated with the 
usual tests to be smaller than the true values.     
Since GC is defined relative to a particular information set, the result of the 
test is conditional on the specification of the model (e.g. it assumes a particular set of 
variables in the VAR and that the data are generated by a VAR of finite order rather 
than say a VARMA model). We have assumed the model is linear, Karagianni and 
                                                 
4 There are other test procedures, e.g. using the cross-spectrum, but these have not been widely used in 
defence economics, an exception is Gerace (2002). These face similar difficulties to the VAR approach 
on which we concentrate. 
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Pempetzoglu (2009) consider non-linear GC of military expenditures in Turkey.  The 
tests can be sensitive to the inclusion of trends and other deterministic elements, such 
as seasonal dummies, and the choice of lag length. Information criteria, like the AIC 
or SBC are often used to choose the lag length, but different criteria may give 
different indications. There is a crucial trade-off, which appears here and elsewhere. 
Adding extra lags reduces the probability of misspecification and thus bias; but also 
increases the standard errors, reducing the power of the test. The power is the 
probability that one will reject the null (GNC) when it is false, so low power means 
that one is less likely to find significant Granger causality. 
There are issues in the choice of measures of military expenditure. In the 
literature levels, growth rates and shares in GDP of military expenditure have been 
used and real military expenditure may be calculated using some general price index 
like the GDP deflator or a military specific price index. In some circumstances, this 
does not matter. Suppose ty  is the logarithm of GDP and  is log military 
expenditure (either both real or both nominal), so 
tm
t tsm m yt= −  is the log share. We 
can reparameterise the VAR in (1), by rearranging the right hand side of the first 
equation, then subtracting the first equation from the second and rearranging the right 
hand side of the result to give:   
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
10 10 11 12 1 12 1 11 12 2 12 2 1
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 10 20 10 21 11 22 12 1 22 12 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
21 11 22 12 2 22 12 2 2 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [( ) ( )] ( )
[( ) ( )] ( ) (
t t t t t
t t t
t t t t
y a a t a a y a sm a a y a sm u
sm a a a a t a a a a y a a sm
a a a a y a a sm u u
− − − − t
− −
− −
= + + + + + + + +
= − + − + − + − + −
+ − + − + − + − )
 
(2A) 
So we can write a statistically identical system to (1) as: 
1 2 1 1 2 2
10 10 11 1 12 1 11 2 12 2 1
1 2 1 1 2 2
20 20 21 1 22 1 21 2 22 2 2 1( )
t t t t t t
t t t t t
y b b t b y b sm b y b sm u
sm b b t b y b sm b y b sm u u
− − − −
− − − −
= + + + + + +
= + + + + + + −t t
  
(2B) 
Where the  are functions of the . Which is the more useful parameterisation 
depends on what it is to be used for; one cannot test between them, since they are 
observationally equivalent. However, the test of 
k
ijb
k
ija
ty  being GNC for  tests a 
different hypothesis from that for 
tsm
ty  being GNC for , because a different 
combination of the  are set to zero; though the test for  and  being GNC for 
tm
k
ija tsm tm
ty  are equivalent, as can be seen from the first row of (2A).  Pesaran and Smith 
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(1998, section 4) give a more general treatment of such linear transformations of 
variables in VARS.  
As discussed below, one can also convert (1) into a growth rate model through 
the use of a vector error correction model, VECM. However, the comparison between 
models using the levels and logarithms of the variables is more complicated, since 
they are not nested. A related measurement issue is that one might think that there is 
endogeneity because GDP includes military expenditure as a component and one 
might also want to use the non-military component of GDP instead of GDP.  
 If a set of variables are integrated of order one, I(1), stationary after being 
differenced once, as seems common for economic variables, and there exist linear 
combinations of them which are I(0), stationary; they are said to cointegrate. If there 
is cointegration, there must be GC in at least one direction; some feedback which 
stops the I(1) variables diverging. In dealing with I(1) data, it is convenient to rewrite 
the VAR, equation (1), in vector error correction model, VECM, form 
1
1
1
k
t o t t i t i
i
Y a d Y Y u
−
− −
=
Δ = +Π + Γ Δ +∑ t
 
 
 
       (3A) 
or for this specific case 
1 2
10 10 11 1 12 1 11 1 12 1 1
1 2
20 20 21 1 22 1 21 1 22 1 2
t t t t t
t t t t
y a a t y m y m u
m a a t y m y m u
π π γ γ
π π γ γ
− − − −
− − − −
Δ = + + + + Δ + Δ +
Δ = + + + + Δ + Δ +
t
t t
(3B) 
This is just a reparameterisation, the intercepts and residuals of the VECM and VAR 
will be identical and the VECM parameters are just transformations of the VAR 
parameters, e.g. . If the  variables are I(1) and cointegrate, so that 
there are  linear combinations that are I(0), this implies restrictions on the 
VECM of the form 
1 2
11 11 11 1a aπ = + − n
r n<
αβΠ =  where α  is an n r×  matrix and β  a r n×  matrix. The  
variables are then determined by r cointegrating variables, which are I(0), and  
stochastic trends, which are I(1). If the variables are I(1) and do not cointegrate, r  
and all 
n
n r−
0=
0ijπ = , giving a first difference model; i.e. in growth rates if the variables are 
logarithms. If  all the variables are I(0).  r n=
The dynamic characteristics of the VAR are determined by the roots of its 
determinantal equation. A VAR with  variables and  lags will have  roots. It is n k nk
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stable if all the inverse roots lie within the unit circle, complex roots will give cyclical 
behaviour and each stochastic trend will give a root on the unit circle.  
In imposing the cointegration restrictions, there is a long-run identification 
problem, since for any non-singular r r×  matrix P then 1 *( )( )P P *αβ α β α β−= =  so 
β  and *β  are observationally equivalent. To identify α  and β  one needs to specify 
P, i.e. provide  just-identifying restrictions, r on each cointegrating vector. Just-
identifying restrictions are not testable. Thus with  two variables and one 
cointegrating vector, , one restriction on the cointegrating vector is needed. 
This can be provided by a normalisation restriction. Normalised on 
2r
2, 1n r= =
ty , the I(0) linear 
combination is t t tz y m tθ δ= − − , where θ  is the long run effect of  on tm ty  and the 
trend has been restricted to lie inside the cointegrating vector.  
Imposing these 2 cross-equation restrictions gives: 
10 1 1 1 11 1 12 1 1
20 2 1 1 21 1 22 1 2
( ( 1))
( ( 1))
t t t t t
t t t t t
t
t
y a y m t y m v
m a y m t y m v
α θ δ γ γ
α θ δ γ γ
− − − −
− − − −
Δ = + − − − + Δ + Δ +
Δ = + − − − + Δ + Δ +   (4) 
Where the iα  are feedback or adjustment coefficients which measure how the 
deviations from equilibrium ( )t t tz y m tθ δ= − −  feed back onto each variable. In this 
case one could have short-run GC from  to tm ty , because 12 0;γ ≠  yet no long-run 
causality because 1 0.α =  If  1 0α =  (there is no long-run feedback of the 
disequilibrium on ty ), and 2 0,α ≠  ( does adjust to the disequilibrium); one would 
probably want to normalise on , since military expenditure seems to be determined 
by output. Notice there is no statistical way to determine the correct normalisation. 
tm
tm
 
4. The US case 
 
The issues discussed above will be illustrated on US data. Model (1), a second order 
bivariate VAR with trend, was estimated on US data for two samples. The shorter 
sample, 1950-2009, allows comparison with equations using unemployment below; 
the longer sample, 1932-2009, includes part of the Great Depression and the whole of 
World War II. The log of real GDP is denoted ty  and  is the log of real national 
defence expenditure converted to constant prices by the GDP deflator. Unusually, the 
tm
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information criteria agree on the choice of 2 lags for both samples, and the trend is 
significant in the ty  equation.  
We will present the results of the tests in terms of p values, which roughly 
give the probability that the null hypothesis, GNC, is true; so low p values indicate 
Granger causality. Table 1 gives p values for the GNC tests in each direction for 
various models and samples. In model 1 (2 lags, with  trend,  and tm ty ), given in the 
first row, for 1950-2009, GNC of  with respect to tm ty , would be rejected at the 10% 
level, with p=0.0959, but not at the 5% level; while GNC of ty  with respect to  
would be rejected at the 5% level, p=0.0201, but not at the 1% level. For model 1, 
with the 1932-2009 sample, GNC of  with respect to 
tm
tm ty  would be rejected at the 
5% level, and of ty  with respect to  at the 10% level. So for both samples using the 
10% level one would conclude that there is GC in both directions; using the 1% level 
in neither direction; at the 5% level the answer would differ between samples. 
tm
  
Table 1.  Bivariate VAR, US real military expenditure and GDP 
 p values for null of GNC    
  1950-2009 1932-2009 
  mGNCy yGNCm mGNCy yGNCm 
      
1 2 lags trend 0.0959 0.0201 0.0166 0.0537 
2 2 lags no trend 0.0746 0.0002 0.0905 0.0075 
3 1 lag, trend 0.0342 0.4959 0.0179 0.8380 
4 3 lags, trend 0.1684 0.0346 0.0240 0.0939 
5 Using LSM 0.0959 0.0045 0.0166 0.0107 
6 Using SM 0.0487 0.0001 0.4131 0.0110 
7 Using LYNM 0.0440 0.0215 0.0004 0.0002 
 
Model 2, in the second row removes the trend; model 3, keeps the trend and 
uses one lag; model 4 keeps the trend and uses three lags. Model 5 replaces log real 
military expenditure by the log share with 2 lags and trend and as this is the 
reparameterisation discussed above, the p value for  being GNC for tsm ty  is identical 
to that for model 1. Model 6 replaces log real military expenditure by the share, a 
change in functional form. Model 7 uses log real military expenditure but replaces log 
GDP by the log of GDP minus military expenditure. 
The p values are clearly sensitive to sample, specification, measurement, and 
significance level; though there is no clear pattern in how these factors change the p 
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values. While one might expect that using non-military GDP rather than GDP would 
reduce the predictive power of military expenditure, in fact it increases it markedly for 
the 1932-2009 period. There is clearly some evidence for predictability. There are 28 
tests in total: two directions, two samples, seven models. Of these, in all but 4 cases 
GNC is rejected at the 10% level. However, the evidence is rather marginal since 
GNC is only rejected at the 1% level in 6 cases.  
Turning to cointegration, for the system using  and tm ty , over 1950-2009, the 
inverse roots are: 0.9; 0.43 ; and 0.29. This indicates the system is stable, no 
stochastic trends, but the largest inverse root of 0.9 may be biased down and may not 
be significantly less than unity. For the 1932-2009 sample the inverse roots are 
 and .  Over 1950-2009, both the Johansen trace and 
eigenvalue tests at the 5% level suggest 
0.31i±
0.79 0.25i± 0.46 0.38i±
2r =  with no trend, which implies both 
variables are I(0). However, when a trend is included, Johansen tests suggest , 
which we choose and we normalise the long-run relationship on log GDP, to give  
1r =
0.431 0.038
(0.093) (0.002)
t t ty m t= − + +z
1 1
1 2
t
t
 
It is not clear how one would interpret this long-run relationship, however it was 
normalised and it is not plausible to take it at face value: a one percent increase in 
military expenditure reduces GDP by almost half a percent in the long-run. The 
VECM is: 
 
1 1
2
1 1
2
0.107 + 0.110 0.015
(0.030) (0.125) (0.029)
0.022, 0.193
0.486 +1.339 0.322
(0.106) (0.440) (0.101)
0.078, 0.438
t t t t
t t t t
y z y m
SER R
m z y m
SER R
− − −
− − −
Δ = − Δ − Δ +
= =
Δ = − Δ + Δ +
= =
v
v
 
Both the adjustment coefficients have the expected sign and are significant; both the 
lagged changes in GDP and military expenditure have significant effects on military 
expenditure, but neither of the lagged changes have significant effects on GDP. Since 
it is difficult to interpret the cointegrating relationship it might be better to assume 
 and treat both variables as trend stationary, but this is a matter of judgement. 2r =
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5. Size of the effects 
 
Although it is common just to report the results of the test, as was done in table 1 
above; knowing that there is GC is of little interest in itself without knowing the sign. 
It matters whether higher military expenditure predicts higher or lower output, but 
since the test has a two sided alternative, the test statistics or p values are 
uninformative about this.  Measuring the sign of the effect is not straightforward. For 
instance,  may be GC for tm ty , with both  and   significantly different from 
zero, but of opposite sign and roughly equal size. Then there is a short-run effect but 
no long-run effect, since .  
1
12a
2
12a
1 2
12 12 0a a+ =
The standard way to analyse the effect of a shock to one variable on another in 
a VAR is by calculating the impulse response functions, IRFs, which measure the 
effect of a shock at period  on future values of the variables. IRFs are calculated 
from the moving average representation of the VAR:  
t
1 1 1
0
( ) ( ) ( )t o t t o t
i
Y A L a d A L u A L a d C u
∞− − −
i t i−
=
= + = +∑  
where the  can be obtained recursively from the . Orthogonalised or Cholesky 
IRFs, require the model to be identified and assume a recursive structure,  
implemented by the ordering of the variables. Unless the reduced form 
contemporaneous covariance matrix 
iC iA
Σ  is diagonal, the impulse response functions 
will not be invariant to ordering.  
The alternative generalised IRFs, GIRFs, do not require identification, but 
cannot be given a structural interpretation. The generalised impulse response function 
measures of the effect of a one standard error shock to particular error, , on a 
variable, ,  periods ahead, where a and b are a selection vectors. They are then 
given by,  
tau
t hbY + h
1 1( ) ( ' / ' , ) ( ' / )
( ) ' /( ' ); 0,1, 2,...
t h t t t h t
h
g h E b Y a a I E b Y I
g h b C a a a h
ξ+ −= = Σ −
= Σ Σ =
+ −   
If the variables are stationary,  will tend to zero as  gets large. ( )g h h
The GIRFs, for the unrestricted VAR using the share of military expenditure 
in GDP, 2 lags, with trend 1950-2009, are given in Figure 1 below. The own 
responses are strongly positive, the responses to the other variable are both negative, 
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though only significant for some periods. The correlation between the errors 
12 1 2/( ) 0.306r σ σ σ= = −  is quite large, so the orthogonalised IRFs are sensitive to the 
ordering.  Figure 2 gives the GIRF for the same specification estimated over the 
longer period 1931-2009. The impulse response functions are quite different, showing 
significant positive, not negative responses. This is because over the longer period, 
the contemporaneous correlation of the errors is positive, 0.428r = , rather than 
negative as it was over the shorter period. Since this correlation is not structural, one 
would not expect it to be constant over time. 
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 Fig 1 GIRF 1950-2009, share of military expenditure and log GDP  
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Fig 2 GIRF 1931-2009 share of military expenditure and log GDP 
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6. Instantaneous causality 
 
Granger (1969) discussed instantaneous causality, correlations between the variables 
within the same period, but was clear that his definition did not cover this, since GC 
refers only to prediction of later periods. The instantaneous effect is measured by the 
covariance, 12 1 2( t tE u u )σ = , which as seen above is positive for the longer sample and 
negative for the shorter sample.   
To establish instantaneous causality one must identify the simultaneous 
relationship. This short-run identification problem is distinct from the long-run 
identification associated with the cointegrating variables. One can write the VAR in 
structural form 
0
1
k
t o t i t i
i
tB Y b d BY e−
=
= + +∑  
with . The reduced form VAR parameters in (1A) are given 
by
( ')t tE e e = Ω
1
0 ;i iA B B
−=  .  Short-run identification requires  restrictions to 
identify the contemporaneous interactions 
1
0 0 'B B
− −Σ = Ω 1 2n
0B . The recursive structure used by 
orthogonalised impulse response functions provides the  restrictions by the 
assumptions that 
2n
0B  is triangular, for a suitable ordering of the variables, and  
diagonal. 
Ω
Suppose that 2 0α =  in (4), (which is not the case in our example) then 
military expenditure is weakly exogenous and we can rewrite the first equation of (4) 
to condition on , giving the traditional single equation error correction model 
(ECM) determining output: 
tmΔ
0 0 1 1 1 11 1 12 1( )t t t t t t ty m y m t y m eα β α θ δ β β− − − −Δ = + Δ + − − + Δ + Δ +  
Where 1α  is the speed of adjustment; θ  the long-run coefficient; and 21 12 2/β σ σ=  
measures the short run effect of  on tm ty , which could  be of a different sign to the 
long-run effect .θ  The conditions required to reduce the underlying VAR to an ECM 
and to test for a long-run relationship, irrespective of whether the data are I(0) or I(1), 
are discussed in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001).  
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Expectations further complicate the issue, particularly if one variable is a 
policy instrument. An effective policy instrument will be GNC to the variable it 
controls, since the variable being controlled will follow its desired path as the policy 
instrument offsets the shocks. This is one (of many) possible explanation for the result 
of Tang et al. (2009) who find some evidence for GC from military expenditure to 
unemployment for non-OECD countries but not for OECD countries. If OECD 
countries had more effective policy processes they could offset the effects of military 
expenditure shocks on unemployment, removing the correlation. Of course, the 
explanation may be because non-OECD military expenditures are more labour 
intensive as Tang et al. suggest. 
 
7. Additional variables 
 
It is common to test for GC using a bivariate VAR in military expenditure and another 
focus variable, such as output as above. But this is subject to the criticism that it must 
be misspecified. Other variables than output, such as the threat, determine military 
expenditure, and other variables than military expenditure, such as investment, 
determine output. There is then an issue of the information set used to judge the 
incremental predictability.  The only other information than past   used to predict tm
ty  in the VAR above is the two lags of ty . Since GC tests can be very sensitive to the 
number of variables included in the VAR, one might want to add all relevant variables 
but the number of parameters estimated quickly grows large. If there are  variables 
in a VAR, with lags; each equation has parameters, plus the number of 
deterministic elements. Large VARs can have very poor statistical properties and GC 
tests will lose power.  
n
k nk
There is a substantial literature on possible ways of reducing the 
dimensionality of VARs. One route is to apply Bayesian shrinkage to the parameters 
of a large VAR as in Banbura et al. (2010). Another route is to approximate the 
possible omitted variables by a few factors estimated from a large data set, which are 
then used in a factor augmented VAR, FAVAR. Gupta et al. (2010) examine the 
effect of defence spending on US output using a FAVAR. They converted their data 
into growth rates to ensure stationarity, and while one can estimate cointegrating 
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FAVARs, there is the problem that the factors tend to be based on economic 
variables, while the crucial omitted variables may be strategic.  
Table 2 illustrates the sensitivity of the results to the set of economic variables 
used. Call log GDP, LY, and the share of military expenditure, SM. We add the share 
of investment in GDP, SI and the unemployment rate, U. Output and unemployment 
are linked through ‘Okun’s Law’; investment and output through the accelerator; and 
there has been considerable interest in the effects of military expenditure on both 
investment and unemployment. While there are lots of other possible economic 
variables one could add, such as inflation or interest rates, as noted above what is 
really lacking is a threat variable to explain the movements in military expenditure.  
Table 2 gives the p values for tests of GNC for alternative combinations of the 
variables. Model 1 is an VAR2 with trend in the four variables, estimated over 1950-
2009. The largest inverse root is 0.96, and it proved difficult to identify sensible 
cointegrating vectors, so an unrestricted VAR is used for the tests.  
 
Table 2: GNC tests for VAR2 with trend 1950-2009 
p values for sets of the 4 variables, 
  
  GNC FROM      
          
 TO SM SI U LY 
Model 1         
SM - 0.0038 0.7377 0.0163 
SI 0.0001 - 0.0000 0.5236 
U 0.0721 0.0878 - 0.4712 
LY 0.0003 0.0076 0.0000 - 
Model 2         
SM - - 0.8448 0.0284 
U 0.3014 - - 0.0406 
LY 0.0170 - 0.0000 - 
Model 3         
SM - 0.0036 - 0.0189 
SI 0.0012 - - 0.6902 
LY 0.0106 0.1255 - - 
Model 4         
SM - - - 0.0001 
LY 0.0487 - - - 
Model 5         
SM - 0.0000 - - 
SI 0.0010 - - - 
Model 6         
SM - - 0.0083 - 
SU 0.5817 - - - 
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The test results for model (1) indicate that at any reasonable significance level 
(a) unemployment is GNC for the share of military expenditure and (b) log output is 
GNC for the share of investment and unemployment. The other 9 tests indicate 
possible GC at significance levels below 10%. Model 2 drops the share of investment, 
model 3 the unemployment rate, models 4, 5 and 6 are the three bivariate relationships 
of each economic variable with the share of military expenditure (model 4 is the same 
as reported in Table 1).   There are marked differences between models.  
Unemployment is clearly not GC for the military share, when output is 
included (models 1 and 2) but is strongly GC in the bivariate model 6. The military 
share is GC for unemployment at the 10% level when output and investment are 
included, but not when they are dropped. The fact that there is significant GC in both 
directions between the military and investment shares seems robust across models. In 
the investment share equation of model 1, 1tSM −  has a coefficient (t statistic) of -0.80 
(-3.7) and  0.42 (2.1); in the military share equation 2tSM − 1tSI −  has a coefficient (t 
statistic) of 0.42 (3.22) and  -0.25 (-1.89), the correlation between the errors in 
the investment and military share equations is -0.61. 
2tSI −
These estimates confirm that conclusions on GC can be very sensitive to the 
number of variables included in the VAR, as well as to lag length, treatment of 
deterministics, and assumptions about order of integration and cointegration. Given 
the large number of possible specifications and the danger of data-mining, searching 
for results in accord with one’s beliefs; there is an issue about how results should be 
reported. We have been able to report the degree of specification sensitivity in much 
more detail than is usually possible in the literature.  
 
8. Other countries 
We now consider more countries, to see whether there is any internationally 
consistent pattern of GC. Table 3 gives tests for six countries (Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands,  Sweden, UK, US) for the period 1960-2006, using the four variable 
VAR with trend. The lag order is chosen by the Schwarz Bayesian Information 
Criterion, which chooses one lag for all countries except the US, where two lags are 
chosen.  
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Table 3. Granger Causality p values 1960-2006 
    From     
To         
 SM SI U LY 
Italy         
SM - 0.8936 0.8100 0.0758 
SI 0.4012 - 0.3568 0.8117 
U 0.3721 0.0191 - 0.0436 
LY 0.0988 0.3814 0.2117 - 
Japan         
SM - 0.2253 0.9263 0.0839 
SI 0.2446 - 0.3144 0.7826 
U 0.3851 0.6335 - 0.6320 
LY 0.7926 0.0696 0.2725 - 
Netherlands         
SM - 0.3937 0.1538 0.0160 
SI 0.4586 - 0.6660 0.2075 
U 0.0091 0.4406 - 0.1489 
LY 0.1178 0.3364 0.0053 - 
Sweden         
SM - 0.8838 0.9076      0.9724 
SI 0.1776 - 0.8446 0.9437 
U 0.3524 0.8908 - 0.1112 
LY 0.1866 0.5442 0.0191 - 
UK         
SM   0.6239 0.6875 0.6219 
SI 0.4836 - 0.0001 0.0000 
U 0.3040 0.0001 - 0.0001 
LY 0.9384 0.0041 0.1183 - 
US         
SM - 0.0227 0.4861 0.1869 
SI 0.9275 - 0.0231 0.1879 
U 0.2387 0.4508 - 0.0002 
LY 0.7464 0.7589 0.1567 - 
 
The Table is read in the usual way, so for Italy the only evidence of GC at the 
5% level is from the share of investment to unemployment (p=0.019). There is little 
evidence of  GC involving the share of military expenditure, of the 36 tests involving 
military expenditure only 3 are significant at the 5% level. In the Netherlands the 
share is GC for unemployment and output is GC for the share. In the US investment is 
GC for the share. Of the 36 tests not involving military expenditure, ten are 
significant.  Of course, with different samples or specifications of the VAR one might 
have got different answers. 
    Above the countries were treated individually, but much of the recent work on 
military expenditures and GC has treated the multiple countries as a panel (e. g. Tang 
et al., 2009). Testing for GC in panels raise a range of further econometric issues. 
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These include the specification of the appropriate null and alternative hypotheses and 
the choice between the large number of possible estimators for dynamic, 
heterogeneous panels with cross-section dependence and potentially non-stationary 
data. Some of these issues are discussed in Smith and Fuertes (2010).  
 
9. Conclusion 
The nature of the interaction of military expenditure with the economy has been the 
subject of extensive investigation and tests for Granger non-causality, in the context 
of a VAR, have been a popular tool in this investigation. This paper has provided a 
critical review of the available techniques and illustrated the issues with data for the 
US and some other OECD countries. The tests were seen to be sensitive to: how many 
variables are included in the VAR, lag lengths, treatment of deterministic elements, 
the sample or observation window used, the treatment of integration and cointegration 
and the significance level used. 
 Statistical measures may not be informative about these choices in the sense 
that the likelihood function is relatively flat and it may not be obvious how to trade 
off the benefit of better fit and the cost of added uncertainty that results from 
estimating extra parameters. Since the parameters are not structural they may not be 
stable over different time periods or different countries, and this was the case with the 
empirical results here.   
It is important to recognise that Granger causality test statistics are 
uninformative about the size or direction of the predicted effects and Granger 
causality measures incremental predictability not economic causality.  To determine 
how Granger causality relates to economic causality requires an identified structural 
model, and different, observationally equivalent, just identifying assumptions may 
give very different causal pictures. While identification is difficult, some orientation 
of the research effort to try to develop more structural models would seem to be 
potentially more fruitful than less theoretical statistical approaches. One obstacle to 
developing more structural models is providing measures of the political and strategic 
determinants of military expenditures, such as threats.  
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